Third-Wave Feminism--Society Be Damned or Personal Choice Activism?

According to Sowards and Renegar (2006), third wave feminism is characterized by individual activities, rather than collective, allowing for a multitude of approaches that is recognized more by their lack of integration than by anything else. They argued that “rhetorical acts of contemporary feminism . . . might also include creating grassroot models of leadership, using strategic humor, building feminist identity, sharing stories, and resisting stereotypes and labels” (p. 58). Thus, a Mormon Mommy blog could be viewed as third wave feminism, as could the NudePhotoRevolutionaries calendar (Christensen, 2012)—polar opposites on the liberal-conservative scale. The connecting factor to both of these contributions to feminist thought is the expression of “personal choice” (Sowards & Renegar, p. 62) by women who have found ways to express their personal identity and self-autonomy. Women have rejected the “hegemonic feminist thought and theories of the second wave” (p. 65), finding expression at a personal rather than social level.

Is this a kinder, gentler feminism than has been expressed in the past? I know I always felt that second-wave feminists weren’t speaking for me with their rejection of the male half of society. The idea that my personal choices contribute to increased opportunity for women appeals to me.

However, other writers don’t view it that way. Some appear to view it as an expression of “nothing I do matters, so I’ll do what I want and society be damned” attitude. Greta Christensen (2012) wrote the following about her participation in the NudePhotoRevolutionaries calendar:

We can try to navigate the narrow, essentially impossible shoals of these contradictory expectations, and try to find that perfect, socially acceptable line between slut and prude. Or we can say, “Fuck it. There is no way I can win — so I’m going to do whatever the fuck I want. I’m going to wear overalls, or I’m going to wear high heels. I’m going to have sex with twenty strangers in a night, or I’m not going to have sex with anyone. I’m going to dress conservatively and professionally in public at all times, or I’m going to sell naked pictures of myself on the Internet if I bloody well feel like it.” And in saying, “I can’t win, so I’m going to do whatever the fuck I want to do,” we can create the beginnings of a victory. (para. 16-17)

Shugart, Waggoner, and Hallstein (2001) argued that mass media has co-opted feminism, repackaged it, and sold it back to us as kind and friendly—something we find in the local grocery store—as if we can buy our way to a better society. Anderson and Stewart (2005) agreed, extending the commodification to the political arena, where the votes of women can be bought and sold if the appeal to vote is packaged in the latest fashion.

Are women really that shallow? Have the ideals of second-wave feminism been bought and sold for a mess of pottage?

Or have we found that the variety of ways women have expressed themselves throughout history is bigger than a feminism wave can accommodate? I think of the quilters of the 19^th century who expressed themselves through their fabric, telling stories that only other quilters would understand. Their creative strength appeals to me as they reach out over the centuries speaking of courage and comfort in a timeless understanding that we need both in our lives. Were these third-wave feminists also? Are we only now rediscovering the activist nature that has always been among us, and are claiming it as our own? Is third-wave feminism just a name for the diversity of women everywhere?

References

Anderson, K. V. & Stewart, J. (2005). Politics and the single woman: The “Sex and the City Voter” in campaign 2004. Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 5, 595-616.

Christensen, G. (2012, April 4). What I may do with my naked body: A reply to Azar Majedi about the #NakedPhotoRevolutionaries calendar [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://freethoughtblogs.com/greta/2012/04/04/what-i-may-do-with-my-naked-body/

Shugart, H. A., Waggoner, C. E., & Hallstein, D. L. O. (2001). Mediating third-wave feminism: Appropriation as postmodern media practice. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 18, 194-210.

Sowards, S. K. & Renegar, V. R. (2006). Reconceptualizing rhetorical activism in contemporary feminist contexts. The Howard Journal of Communications, 17, 57-74.

Troubled Gender, Identity and Home

How important is it to society to promote a philosophical ideology that gender is ambiguous, or troubled? Reading Sloop’s book, Disciplining Gender, one might have the impression that it is extremely important, and that those who attempt to define themselves as existing within a specific gender category are selling out to the establishment. Even with the expanded societal acceptance of non-traditional gender categories, Sloop suggests that the mere identification of one’s self within a category, traditional, or otherwise, reiterates and reinforces the existence of categories. Only by resisting categorization, he posits, do we create a space where gender is allowed to become more fluid; where it can be viewed on a continuum rather than as discrete entities. He argues that society conditions us to expect categories, so we discipline each other to conform to categories, even if those categories are in and of themselves non-conforming.

For instance, in the chapter on k.d. lang, Sloop argued that in her early years (before she came “out”) she was “far more troubling” than later; that she “moves from troubling gender, sexuality, and genre categories . . . to reaffirming generic and gender categories” (p. 102). He suggested that she moved from the troubling approach due to a need for society to define her. He even hinted that as a result of her decision to identify as butch she was rewarded by society in the form of better musical contracts, more fan support, and greater monetary reward, because she finally fit into some norm that society was willing to accommodate.

But is this the only explanation that can be rendered for k. d. lang’s increased success? I would argue that an alternative process might be at work that is of equal importance—if not to society, certainly to the individual. That is the notion of identity. This notion is hinted at in one of lang’s comments about coming out. She described her move as freeing because it “eliminated a lot of tension. . . . It’s really a fantastic feeling. I highly recommend to anybody in this situation to live in the truth” (p. 96).

In order to understand lang’s position better, I watched several videos of her, both prior to her coming out—the period Sloop argues is far more troubling—and after. I noticed a significant difference in these pre- and post- performances. She seemed more comfortable with herself after she decided to come out. Everything about her music seemed to fit together, from style of dress to style of music. I could see the difference she described. She appeared to have found her personal identity, and was living at ease within the construction she had claimed.

On the other hand, other individuals described within Sloop’s book had difficulty finding a sense of personal identity within a societal-described category. Societal discipline around sexual preferences collided with societal discipline around violent behavior and for two individuals, their exploration of the boundaries describing options for identity resulted in death. So, is this really where Sloop is going with all this rhetoric about creating space for troubling gender? That we need to provide a wider range of options for individuals who can’t find a sense of their personal identity within existing options?

One of the most significant courses I have taken thus far in my doctoral program spent a significant portion of time on theories of student development, which in large part focus on how students sort out a sense of personal identity. These theories are subsets of the broader field of human development, which also includes identity as a major factor of development. I would propose that what our feminist rhetoric is “all about” ultimately, is this search for identity. For lang, finding and claiming her identity was important to her for her personal development. An alternative reading of the other case studies could also make the same claim.

Where does this get us with the notion of troubling societal gender categories? I think it recognizes that many traditional categories give many people fits, even if they aren’t specifically questioning sexual orientation. For instance, as I grew up, the expected activities for a female my age weren’t what I wanted to do. I didn’t like playing with dolls or dressing in pink. I was good at math and science, and could take almost anything apart and put it back together again.

When I got into college, I rebelled at the notion that I was attending to get my MRS. degree. I suggested that in my church's Young Women’s and Relief Society instruction, we should prepare our girls and women for roles other than wife and motherhood, because the reality was that many girls and women would grow up and choose alternate paths. We shouldn’t be so short-sighted that we fail to acknowledge the legitimacy and normality of alternate paths, because the search for one’s place in the world—one’s identity—is important for people. Thus, if troubling a gender category is what is necessary to provide people with alternatives in order to find identity, I can see where there is value in pushing those limits.

However, as I read Sloop’s (2004) arguments of how culture disciplines gender, and drives rhetoric around sexual identity, I didn’t have a sense that he was working towards providing people with additional options for seeking identity. He seemed to argue that the important thing is the turbulence; that reducing turbulence is antithetical to the feminist movement. So, throughout the book, I couldn’t help but wonder how comfortable any person might feel living a life of “troubled gender” as proposed by Sloop. For me, it would leave me too troubled to feel human—to feel like I had any sense of purpose or direction—that I was just another animal—and that is what human development theorists say is the point of establishing identity in the first place—becoming human.

That leads me to wonder if discipline is the practice that makes us human. As we learn to control our thoughts and actions—as we discipline our own selves, we enter into a social contract with those around us, and we become part of humanity. Discipline, therefore, is not a bad thing. It helps us enter into relationships with others so that we can create bonds of understanding. If everything in life were always random, where would we find understanding? Sloop's examples of violent reprisal for gender non-conformance demonstrate what happens when too many life events are random. All discipline departs. Perhaps our categories are too narrow, and they need to be broader, but I can’t agree with Sloop’s final argument that we need more troubling without coming to a final sense of one’s place. Every person wants to find a home.

So, while Sloop talks about the implications of the “politics of ‘homes’” (p. 149) as if it is a bad thing, I am reminded of a song from Pippin entitled Corner of the Sky. Even as the main character explored the breadth of human experience, he always wanted to find his sense of identity—his personal place. It wasn't a societal push, it was an inner urge. I think for humankind this feeling is universal. While we may explore and push our boundaries, ultimately, the search is for a solid place where we can proclaim “This is Who I Am” to the world. We can finally declare, “I am human, and here is my home.”

Polysemy, the Presidential Campaign, and Mormons

I have been following this year’s presidential campaign with more than my usual amount of interest because a member of my church (and a friend of my brother and sister-in-law) is running for office. You may have heard about him—his name is Mitt Romney. Romney has run into some unique challenges during his run(s) for office that directly affect me—more on this later. So, while preparing for our class this week, a quote from this week’s readings caught my attention: “It is as if a dozen candidates . . . are running for the Presidency of an undiscovered country, looking for connections, for a nerve to touch, seeking a language” (McGee, 1975, p. 245). This could have been written yesterday about the current presidential campaign. It is to the point that news articles talk about the “not-Romney” Republican candidate of the week, as the various candidates attempt to reframe their position as they go from state to state seeking votes.

The questions of “Who is my audience?” and “How will my audience interpret my message?” have never been more important—nor have they been harder to define—than in this campaign. Our country is experiencing hard times, and our country’s leadership helps to determine the direction we take to overcome those hard times. What (or whose) vision do we want to follow? As McGee elaborated,

Each political myth presupposes a “people” who can legislate reality with their collective belief. So long as “the people” believe basic myths, there is unity and collective identity. When there is no fundamental belief, one senses a crisis which can only be met with a new rhetoric, a new mythology. (p. 245)

We have several streams of rhetoric wandering through the current political landscape. While it is an easy journalistic shorthand to refer to them as conservative and liberal (or red and blue), the reality falls into a much more complicated mix of opinion. For instance, one candidate, Ron Paul, proposes less government. Most would consider this conservative. However, many in the radical feminist movement are equally supportive of less government, because they feel the hegemonic practices of government interfere with the ability of individuals to exercise their freedom. Less government could also mean no border patrol (liberal), smaller military (liberal), lower taxes (conservative), and potentially no Department of Education (antithetical). Thus, McGee’s point that competitive relationships exist within each individual is born out within a single candidate’s position. There is no collective identity here—there is a confused mass of interwoven ideals that lead from a single position.

How is an audience supposed to respond to this confusion? This leads me to our Condit (1989) reading on polysemy. Basically, proponents of polysemy argue that audiences have the ability “to shape their own readings” (p. 103) of text and media. While Condit granted that it is possible for individuals to talk back to and create their own frames for understanding the media, she proposed that it is much more accurate to define this process as polyvalent responses to any given message, because different life experiences—and in particular, socio-education levels—affect the ability of any given individual to create a different shape to the normative message. So, while different interpretations may be possible, the reality is a wide range of possible interpretations, with most of them following the general “expected” response. Thus, she argued,

If the particular range of television’s textual polysemy excludes marginal group messages, and if oppositional reading requires comparatively oppressive quantities of work, then minority groups are indeed silenced, even as audiences, and therefore discriminated against in important ways. (p. 110)

Extrapolating from Condit’s argument to the question of how an audience is supposed to respond to the political posturing of our current candidates means that audiences will respond as they are expected to respond, because the political rhetoric is too complicated for the average voter to sort through. Thus, if the media presents a candidate as two-faced, that is how the average voter will judge that candidate. If the media finds someone who accuses a candidate of some crime, even if the candidate is subsequently exonerated, the average voter will only have heard about the initial accusation, and made a decision based on the initial sound-bite.

This is huge for Mitt Romney because the media wants to make something big out of his religious beliefs. While he wants to focus on his experience and leadership, the media is bound and determined to ratchet the “weirdness” of his personal beliefs into the national consciousness. I doubt his campaign team has recognized how significant this is, given Condit’s analysis. In other words, the Romney team (and those associated with the Mormon Church) are being targeted and marginalized by the media, because most voters will not engage in the amount of study it would take to overcome the anti-Mormon message currently being promoted by popular media. It is subtle, but very persistent.

It comes as no surprise then, to me, to see that while the Church claims its “I’m a Mormon” campaign is a-political, the media blitz corresponds directly with the Romney campaign because the anti-Mormon message goes well beyond this candidate’s effort. It hits at every person who claims membership in the Church—which is where I come in. It doesn’t take much effort to transfer that “weird” belief that a presidential candidate holds to the person who lives next door who you know goes to the same church in the same way that it didn’t take much effort to transfer the actions of a few terrorists to the much larger (and much more peaceful) Muslim community. Thus, another segment of the population becomes marginalized unless some effort is made to counteract that marginalization process. While The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has indicated a preference to be called by its full name, it has come to terms with embracing the more common “Mormon” terminology in order to educate a nation being targeted with anti- messages. So, to adopt a note from the campaign, my name is Karen Marie Hansen Morgan, I am a mother, doctorate student, writer, business analyst, farmer, musician, and I am a Mormon. (If I am weird, it’s probably because I’m a farmer.)

How we disenfranchise members of our society is something we need to become more aware of in order to counteract this type of marginalizing rhetoric. Regardless of one’s political position, if this training in critical rhetoric is to have use in “the real world” we need to focus our attention on those instances where the message is divisive. Letting a message sender “get away with it” means we contribute to the problem, and not to the solution. Attending to the rhetoric in the current political campaign is a good place to start.

Beauvoir Literature Review

De Beauvoir, S. (1972). Introduction. In H. M. Parshley (Trans.), The Second Sex. Retrieved from http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/de-beauvoir/2nd-sex/introduction.htm (Original work published 1949)

Summary:

In her introduction to The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir established her argument that women have traditionally been treated as other with a woman’s context existing only in relation to men. Thus, she claims, “humanity is male” and women is “not regarded as an autonomous being” (para. 6). She claimed that the category of other is “a fundamental category of human thought” (para. 7) that is juxtaposed against the self. In addition, Beauvoir argued, by creating a division between self and other humans justify treatment of those defined as other as less-worthy of a host of privileges. Hence non-natives are generally labeled ‘foreigners’ by those who are native to a country, and non-white races are often labeled ‘inferior’ by those who are white. Beauvoir also claimed that the notion of other turns that individual inessential; or “the object” (para. 9).

Beauvoir next argued that in most cases where the concept of other exists, people are often awakened to the realization that they, too, can be considered other by changes to their environment, such as moving to another country. Oftentimes the other is defined by virtue of a minority status. But women are not a minority—most statistics show them slightly exceeding men in total world population. Beauvoir noted that power inequities have often created other populations; however there have always been women. She claimed that throughout history women have always been subject to men, and that the bond of subjectivity was created by virtue of women’s biological differences from men.

Beauvoir explored the impact of women living in a world where men make and enforce the rules. She claimed that many of the accomplishments claimed by previous feminists were only those that men had been willing to grant, as a master grants his slave certain privileges, but the slave remains in slavery. Furthermore, she suggested that women have been unwilling to claim complete freedom for fear that they will lose the few privileges they have been afforded in the past. “Refusal to pose oneself as the Subject, unique and absolute, requires great self-denial” (para. 24).

Next Beauvior visited the arguments that are often posed as justification for either men or women to be viewed as superior, including the notion of creation (e.g., Adam was first, therefore Eve is secondary to him vis a vis Adam was a rough draft, and Eve was the culmination of God’s perfection in creation). She proposed that the conflict created by these arguments only adds to notions of superiority and inferiority, and we need to start over. However, she cautioned, a sex neutral individual would not have the understanding of the situation, and it is only women, who have experienced the state of womanhood, who can adequately speak for their state and status.

Finally, Beauvior argued that happiness is not the measurement by which we need to assess women’s place in the world. She posited that much of the world views the state of happiness as equivalent to rest. However, she stated, “every subject plays his part as such specifically through exploits or projects that serve as a mode of transcendence; he achieves liberty only through a continual reaching out towards other liberties” (para. 30). Rest is always accompanied by a “degradation of existence . . . and of liberty into constraint and contingence” (para 30). Thus, she stated, she is interested in the “fortunes of the individual as defined not in terms of happiness but in terms of liberty” (para 31). Only by understanding how biological, physiological, psychological, and economic forces have contributed to attempts to control women’s destiny can women “envisage the difficulties in their way, as endeavoring to make their escape from the sphere hitherto assigned to them, they aspire to full membership in the human race” (para 32).

Connections:

The concept of other has been explored by a number of philosophers. Buber (1927/1971) referred to this concept as I and Thou, where the creation of Thou occurs when the I individual views the partner in the relationship as subject rather than object. Otherwise, he described the individuals as I and It. Buber argued that when people view each other as I and Thou, they are able to build relationships with each other. He described the I and It view as merely experience, without engagement. Buber stated that when we view objects (or It) we engage in classification, counting, perceiving, subjugating, dissipating, perpetuating, or any number of actions on the object. Our sentence construction demonstrates this idea: I (subject) tossed the ball (object) away. It is only when we view another as subject or Thou that we engage with that person. Again, sentence construction demonstrates this idea: You and I (subject) discussed our ideas (object). We allow that person the freedom to act for him- or her- self, rather than expecting the person to behave in some manner we have created expectations of or for.

Beauvoir’s arguments echoed Buber’s writings from two decades earlier. In this case, Beauvoir has applied them to an entire group, rather than focusing on a single interpersonal relationship, as Buber did. These views are often placed in the existentialist camp of philosophy—a belief that the agency of humankind allows men and women to direct their own existence, and the quality of their lives will be driven by the choices they make, good or ill. Beauvoir clearly argued that women are not condemned by their biology to a specific destiny; rather women need to find their own path unrestricted by the views of men who classify them as other.

With her insistence that it is women who need to speak for women, and who need to work for their liberty, Beauvoir set the stage for what is now referred to as standpoint theory. Standpoint theory suggests that differences in perception (caused by different lived experiences) are necessary to understand and explain how an individual frames his or her way of knowing and acting. Standpoint theory tends to be critical of claims of objectivity and the scientific method when researching because researchers often do not recognize their own limitations due to unshared experience. Beauvoir’s argument that women need to do their own research laid a foundation for the second wave of feminism—of women who studied their own situation and made claims for their own direction. While many have criticized Beauvoir for her attempt to be inclusive—to create a world where men and women worked towards equality and liberty together—her emphasis that the woman’s voice was required in order to achieve that goal is solidly within the philosophical tradition of standpoint theory.

Finally, Beauvoir introduced the notion that one’s sex does not predestine one’s gender. While she denied the value of a neutral gender, she did object to the idea that one’s biological conformation predetermined how a person should live and act. Rather, she argued that women and men should have the ability to self-determine what characteristics they deemed important, and not some notion of femininity or masculinity. As people increasingly feel the need to understand how the concept of gender plays into their personal identity, we can look to Beauvoir for an initial reading of the difference between one’s biological sex, and one’s gender identity.

On a side note, I found an interesting connection to this concept in part of our scripture reading in church yesterday. The scripture exhorted a man’s sons (biological sex) to rise up and be men (gender identity) (2 Nephi 1:21; Book of Mormon). Our discussion revolved around what it meant to be men. We may believe that sex and gender are one and the same in the religious setting, but they are not.

I Communicate in Fragments

Building on the idea argued by Summers last week that context is key, this week’s readings remind us that every communication, whether it be in text, spoken, or image form, should be considered as merely a fragment of the entire message, and that our skills in rhetorical criticism will be necessary to make sense of it all. McGee stated that Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” oration is “trying to create or is seeking, its audience” (p. 284). The audience, McGee argued, is governed by the cultural context within which it operates. Historically, McGee makes a significant point. King was operating from a cultural context that had its roots in the civil rights movement—but where did those ideas come from?

We often point to Rosa Parks as an innocent instigator for the movement, yet we seldom teach or learn that Ms. Parks learned how to protest as part of her education at the Highlander Folk School located in New Market, TN. The school was originally founded by Myles Horton in 1932 as a social justice training school for labor leaders. Besides Ms. Parks, it trained King and many other leaders in social justice and non-violent approaches to activism. The civil rights movement was not a movement that began in the trenches, and found leadership. Instead, Highlander trained leaders, and from there those leaders went in search of an audience. Ms. Parks found hers on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama.

Even this historical setting is a fragment of the events occurring within the world. The Highlander School was founded at a time of worker unrest due to unemployment, lack of good working conditions, and the Depression. Adult educators who were concerned about the rights of all citizens deliberately started a school to train people in the principles of activism leadership. Horton based his ideas on schools in Europe. Each of the ideas within King’s monumental speech built upon a foundation laid early on by many great thinkers. King often gave credit to Ghandi. Ghandi gave credit to many religious traditions, including Jain, Buddhism, and Hinduism, among others.

This brings us to Carey’s argument that both the transmission and the ritual views of communication build upon a religious foundation. That foundation, when not taken into account as part of the cultural context of a communication fragment, leads to glossing the communication act itself. As Carey pointed out, when this happens, things become too familiar to us and we overlook the significance of what we are doing. I am reminded of a hit song when I was younger, “Is That All There Is?” from the Broadway play, Cabaret. We assume that all we are experiencing in the communication process, either as creators or receivers, is all there is to experience, so we write it off as irrelevant. We take no notice of the fragmentary nature of our act, nor to its potential significance as a fragment.

Next, McLuhan reminds us of the fragment created by the medium itself. If the word is merely a representation of an idea we have that is the actual reality, how many of us are able to completely express an idea? We have all had the experience of thinking some great thought, and not having the words to capture the full essence of the idea. At best, we come up with an approximation of the idea; a mere fragment of the notion we hoped to convey. The medium we use to frame that idea determines the nature of the fragment. Realizing the way our media use affects our fragmental communication helps us choose from our options, or suggests that we look for other less-obvious approaches.

Finally, I am reminded of a talk I gave in church last Sunday. I was asked to speak on a topic most members would know: the events of the founding of the church. Given the time constraints I had, I selected to focus on some background history of that period of time to help put the founding events in some context. I only provided fragments of information specifically related to the actual founding of the church because I knew my audience was very familiar with those events. However, were I to give the same talk to any other audience, the communication experience would have been very muddled. They would not have been able to place my fragment into their world view.

This returns us to McGee’s argument that today communication is challenged by the fracturing of a homogenous culture into pockets of ever-changing discontinuous cultures. The challenge posed by this fracturing requires understanding where and how to look for the fragments to piece together the communication puzzle confronting us daily. Truly, as McGee states, the “skills of a rhetorician” (p. 288) are required.